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Revisiting Wealth Effects and Merger Premium Determinants in the U.S. 
Financial Services Industry 
Abstract 
 
The U.S. financial services industry’s gains are generally soaring these days in light of 
impending deregulation and lower taxes for their clients as well as for themselves, but have they 
really emerged from the long shadow cast by the global financial crisis? This paper attempts to 
examine this issue focusing on two aspects of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. financial services 
industry: the wealth effects and the merger premiums. Based on a sample of over 2,500 mergers 
and acquisitions deals completed during the period 2004 through 2016 and using the event study 
methodology, this study finds that target shareholders continued to post significant gains throughout 
the crisis period though the number of deals declined dramatically. Bidding firm shareholders went 
from posting significant but low negative returns to insignificant returns with the number of deals 
declining dramatically too. Based on a sample of 210 deals, panel regressions used to identify the 
determinants of merger premiums find the method of payment and product diversification (bank 
acquiring nonbanks) to be significant determinants before the crisis but not so post-crisis. The 
study’s preliminary findings suggest that merger premiums and consolidation in the industry continue 
to be motivated by economies of scale and scope. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The U.S. financial services industry’s gains are generally soaring these days in light of 
impending deregulation and lower taxes for their clients as well as for themselves, but have they 
really emerged from the long shadow cast by the global financial crisis? This paper attempts to 
examine this issue focusing on two aspects of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. financial services 
industry: the wealth effects and the merger premiums. Based on a sample of over 2,500 mergers 
and acquisitions deals completed during the period 2004 through 2016 and using the event study 
methodology, this study finds that target shareholders continued to post significant gains throughout 
the crisis period though the number of deals declined dramatically. Bidding firm shareholders went 
from posting significant but low negative returns to insignificant returns with the number of deals 
declining dramatically too. Based on a sample of 210 deals, panel regressions used to identify the 
determinants of merger premiums find the method of payment and product diversification (bank 
acquiring nonbanks) to be significant determinants before the crisis but not so post-crisis. However, 
both target and acquiring firm characteristics such as Net Interest Margin, Return on Equity, 
Efficiency ratios among others, continue to be significant post crisis. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation reports that the total number of insured banks declined from 7,634 to 5,116 during our 
sample period; some of these were due to failed banks, others due to consolidation (voluntary and 
including those that were forced to merge with stronger banks). However, our study’s preliminary 
findings suggest that merger premiums and consolidation in the industry continue to be motivated by 
economies of scale and scope. 
Mergers and acquisitions activity in the financial services industry surrounding the financial 
crisis from 2004 through 2016 saw an overall decline in number of deals. The industry as a whole 
experienced large periods of consolidation due to technological advancements, but to what extent 
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did the financial crisis play a role in the consolidation? Shareholder wealth in mergers and 
acquisitions for both targets and acquirers experienced changes throughout this time frame 
surrounding the financial crisis. Meanwhile, the merger premium determinants were consistent in 
some dimensions yet inconsistent in other aspects.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. Section 
3 develops the hypotheses while Section 4 discusses the data and methodology.  Section 5 presents 
the empirical analysis and results while section 6 summarizes the key findings and conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1.   Merger Premium Determinants 
 
One strand of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) research has focused on the factors driving 
acquisition premiums, i.e., the value paid to stockholders of the target or acquired entity over and 
above the known book value of a company. This body of literature can be classified into several 
categories. First, the studies of the medium of exchange, whether the transaction is paid for with 
cash, securities, or a mixture of both, suggest strong correlations between the method of payment 
and the premiums paid to stockholders. Second, prior studies also examine sustained wealth gains 
for the target’s stockholders both in the days leading up to the acquisition as well as for a significant 
period of time post-acquisition. Third, diversification benefits, at both the product and geographical 
level, have shown to influence the perceived value of a target for the potential acquirer during 
mergers and acquisitions. Finally, in addition to these determinants that are relevant across most 
industries, the banking industry has a few specific financial and regulations- related determinants 
and the literature reviewed below will also examine this strand of research. 
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2.2.   Medium of Exchange 
 
The literature provides several theories relating the medium of exchange to the premium paid 
to stockholders of a target in an acquisition.  Using a model of takeovers under asymmetric 
information, Eckbo et al (1990) identify which medium of exchange creates the most value for target 
shareholders. The main premise here is that acquisitions occur in an imperfect world of asymmetric 
information where all involved parties do not have access to the same information set at the same 
time. Their model shows that two-way information asymmetries between the bidder and target leads 
to an optimal mix of cash and stock as the payment method in the takeover transaction. The identified 
equilibrium in this model for the true post acquisition value of the bidder revealed to the target based 
upon the composition of the mixed offer found that this revealed value is increasing and convex in 
relation to the amount of cash used in the offer. Using this model and a study of 182 acquisitions, 
Eckbo et al found that the average announcement month abnormal returns for acquisitions for mixed 
offers, rather than all-cash or all-stock, are significantly positive and larger. 
Ang and Cheng (2006) studied the market-driven acquisition theory to determine the role 
of the medium of exchange in merger premiums paid. The results found in this study prove that 
overvaluation increases the probability that a bidder will use stock as a medium of exchange over 
cash and these overvalued acquirers are better off than similarly overvalued non-acquirers. By 
proving this, Ang and Cheng confirm similar studies showing that cash bids are less overvalued 
than stock bids and cash targets are undervalued relative to stock targets. In a study specifically 
focused in the financial industry, Shawky et al (1996) found the medium of exchange and its 
correlation to the merger premium has a weak relationship compared to other determinants. 
However, Shawky et al state that transactions acquired with stock as opposed to a cash purchase 
generate higher premiums paid to the target. 
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2.3.   Wealth Gains of Stockholders 
 
Examining the gains of the both the bidder’s and target’s stock throughout the acquisition 
time frame reveals potential time frames during the acquisition process when abnormal returns are 
expected. Specifically, Asquith (1983) looks at pre-press date period, the press date, the period 
between the press date and outcome date, the outcome date, and the post-outcome period. The four 
subgroups that Asquith examines are the target of successful and unsuccessful mergers and the 
bidder of successful and unsuccessful acquisitions. This study found that an increasing probability 
of the merger occurring benefits the target’s stockholders, while a decrease in probability harms 
both the bidder’s and target’s stockholders. In another study done by Asquith et al (1983), the 
bidder’s wealth gains are examined in more detail. Asquith et al found in this study that the twenty- 
one days leading to the announcement date of the acquisition have significant stockholder gains 
which fails to support the capitalization hypothesis where gains are captured in the beginning of the 
acquisition program. The study also found that abnormal returns for the bidder are positively related 
to the relative size of the target. The study confirms the value-maximizing behavior shown by 
management of the bidder. In Ang and Cheng’s (2006) study, the overvaluation of the bidder, when 
greater than the target’s premium adjusted overvaluation, lead to higher sustained wealth 
throughout the acquisition timeline compared to similar overvalued non-acquiring firms. In a case 
study analysis of Westpac Banking Corporation, Buckley and Brown (2000) examine the wealth 
effect finding that positive abnormal returns over different event horizons for a value-weighted 
portfolio for both the target and bidder resulted in the market perceiving this acquisition as wealth 
enhancing. Lastly, Eccles et al (1998) found that low premium deals typically correlated with lower 
one-year market returns while high-premium deals resulted with higher one-year market returns 
when controlling for overall market movements. 
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2.4.   Diversification 
 
Diversification for both products that a company can offer and geographically can lead to 
higher premiums based on the possibility of risk reduction. In Diaz and Azofra’s (2009) study of 
the European banking market, the analysis of how geographical and product diversification can 
influence premiums is discussed. For product diversification, non-banking institutions, such as 
investment and insurance companies, acquiring banking institutions and vice versa, may pay higher 
premiums. However, Diaz et al (2004) study found improved profits do not always exist with 
diversification and with this knowledge, bidders that industries differ from their targets will tend to 
pay lower premiums compared bidders within the same industry as their respective target. 
Premiums paid for geographical transactions of interstate verse intrastate have conflicting results 
based on research. Jackson and Gart (1999) state that intrastate transactions lead to larger premiums 
due to reduction of redundant labor and capital inputs. Shawky et al (1996) found that higher 
premiums are expected in interstate acquisitions supporting higher premiums paid for 
diversification across state lines. 
2.5.   Financial Determinants and Unique Characteristics of the Banking Industry 
 
The banking industry’s operations are distinct from all other industries. For instance, the 
banking industry accepts deposits from commercial and retail clients that are transferred to their 
balance sheet as liabilities. They then use this money to loan out to clients and the loans are then 
placed as assets on their balance sheets and are used to generate their revenue or interest income. 
The operations of the banking industry can cause risks for their depositors so the industry is subject 
to a strict regulatory environment to protect the general interests of the public and overall economy. 
Interest rates set by the United States Federal Reserve also impact the short-term borrowing, 
lending, and depository rates that banks operate in which ultimately impacts their net interest 
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margins, the difference between interest income and interest expense. Financial ratios of the 
banking industry largely influence the premiums that bidders are willing to pay. These ratios are 
standard throughout the industry to track the overall operations, capital requirements, and liquidity 
of banks. 
Beatty et al (1987), using a sample of 146 banks, researched the number of domestic 
branches, total investment securities, total U.S. treasury securities, net loans, total assets, equity 
capital, net income, debt to equity ratio, weighted average maturity of U.S. treasury investments, 
ratio of reserve for loan losses to total loans, ratio of loan write-offs to total loans, return of equity, 
and Herfindahl index as variables included as potential bank merger premium determinants. Brewer 
(2000) adds return on assets, total loans to total assets, and book value of capital to total assets to 
the list of variables that can also impact the premium paid for the target, cumulative abnormal 
returns, and standardized cumulative abnormal returns finding that all these variables can be 
significant. Another study by Brewer et al (2000) finds that the regulatory environment significantly 
impacts bank merger activities in general and bank merger prices. Brewer defined the regulatory 
environment as a pre- to post- Riegle-Neal period where merger bid premiums increased 35% from 
pre- to post- Riegle-Neal periods. This study also looks at the board of directors on a banking 
institution finding that independent boards act to increase the wealth of the shareholders of target 
banks. 
Cheng et al (1989) extend the findings of the role of financial characteristics of banks on 
merger premiums by focusing more on bidder-related characteristics and also including more 
proxies for the profitability and growth of the target from their financial statements. Their results 
suggest that some banks try to achieve higher earnings ratios and faster growth resulting in the large  
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premiums paid while also supporting that better managers, determined by better financial ratios, are 
willing to pay more for acquisitions. 
In Diaz and Azofra’s (2009) research, there is a strong emphasis on relative size, the market 
share of the target and how much of that market overlaps with the bidder, ownership, growth in 
assets, and cost to income; adding to the list of determinants that had not been discussed previously. 
Shawver (2005) determines cost savings as a result of the merger as an additional driver of merger 
premiums, and an estimate of the restructure duplication to the bidder, which was found to be 
negative and insignificant. This hypothetical synergy factor as a variable for merger premiums is 
studied in greater detail by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1999) where they found synergy as a 
primary motive and what leads to positive total gains for shareholders. The consensus in the 
literature (see Jackson and Gart 1999, Kowalik et al, 2015, and Shawky et al 1996, for instance) is 
that profitability measures and balance sheet components are both potential determinants of merger 
premiums. The mixed results generated in the literature could partly be due to the different time 
frames of regulatory environments and interest rates of the respective sample periods. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
  
Cumulative abnormal returns that are significantly positive in the financial industry are 
expected to be present for the target shareholders surrounding the announcement date. Acquirer 
shareholders may experience cumulative abnormal returns as well but the expected returns should 
either be negative or very minimal and insignificant. The medium of exchange will impact the price 
an acquirer is willing to pay for a potential target. Based upon the literature review, cash offers tend 
to generate lower premiums than non-cash offers (i.e. stock and a mixture of stock and cash). When 
an acquirer pays with non-cash, the uncertainties surrounding the future price of the stock of the 
acquirer will lead to a higher premium as opposed to cash where the value is more determinable. The 
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geographic diversification that was more relevant in the 1980s and 1990s when regulation would 
cause a barrier for interstate banking tended to generate larger premiums paid for interstate mergers 
as opposed to intrastate mergers, but this hypothesis may no longer be relevant due to the changing 
regulatory environment. Product diversification from a banking institution acquiring a non-banking 
institution or vice versa tends to be associated with more potential risk from moving outside of the 
acquirer’s area of expertise to generate economies of scope thus leading to a lower premium paid 
while a banking institution acquiring another banking institution will produce economies of scale 
and thus a larger premium will be paid. Lastly, profitability and overall measures of financial 
condition from both the target and acquiring firm impacts the valuation assigned to the potential 
target.  
The main hypotheses for this study can be stated as follows. 
Merger premium hypothesis: 
H₁0: There are no cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of the acquirer. 
H₁1: There are cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of the acquirer. 
 
H₂0: There are no cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of the target. 
H₂1: There are cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of the target. 
 
H₃0: The method of payment will not have an effect on merger premiums. 
H₃1: The method of payment will have an effect on merger premiums. 
 
H₄0: Geographic diversification will not have an effect on merger premiums. 
H₄1: Geographic diversification will have an effect on merger premiums. 
 
H₅0: Product diversification mergers will not have an effect on merger premiums. 
H₅1: Product diversification mergers will have an effect on merger premiums. 
 
H₆0: Targets and acquirers with stronger profitability and financial conditions relative to peers will 
not reap larger premiums. 
H₆1: Targets and acquirers with stronger profitability and financial conditions relative to peers will 
reap larger premiums. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
The data necessary to complete this study was obtained from Bloomberg under the Mergers 
and Acquisitions. Under this function, the criteria was originally set to include a time frame between 
January 1st, 2004 and December 31st, 2016 where the completed transaction date occurred within this 
time frame. In addition to the time frame, the following screens were applied: (1) the transaction 
had to be completed, (2) the deal data had to be available, (3) either the target, acquirer, or seller had 
to operate in the United States, and (4) either the target, acquirer, or seller had to operate as a bank. 
With these four criteria settings, the final sample size came down to 7,062.  
4.1.   Data & Methodology: Event Study 
 
For the event study, the software package Eventus© provided the necessary data, where 
daily cumulative mean abnormal returns were obtained from the center for Research in Security 
prices (CRSP) resulting in 2,559 transactions. The following four groups categorized the analysis 
of each event study: returns to acquirer shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are 
publicly traded, returns to target shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are publicly 
traded, returns to target shareholders in all deals, irrespective of acquirer status (private or public), 
and returns to acquirer shareholders in all deals, irrespective of target status (private or public). The 
first event study examines the change in returns before the financial crisis, during the financial 
crisis, and then after the financial crisis as well as the entire time frame (2004 – 2016). Pre-crisis 
period in the event study is defined as the beginning of 2004 to the end of February in 2008, the 
month before the first large global investment bank, The Bear Stearns Companies, was sold to 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. because of the subprime mortgage crisis. The crisis period was then defined 
as March 2008 to the end of 2011 and the post-crisis period was defined as the beginning of 2012 
to the end of 2016. The cumulative abnormal returns used in this study were benchmarked against 
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the CRSP value weighted index, however, the CRSP equally weighted market index, the Standard 
& Poor’s 500 index, and the Fama-French daily factors were also analyzed and found similar results 
to the CRSP value weighted index. Acquisition announcement date defined the event date for the 
event study with an estimation period of [-250,-50]. The following testing periods resulted in similar 
cumulative abnormal returns: [-10,10], [-5,5], [-2,2], [-1,1], [-1,0], and [0,1].  
4.2. Data & Methodology: Merger Premiums 
 
With the 7,062 results obtained from Bloomberg, only 542 had the available Committee on 
Uniform Securities Identification Procedures numbers. Firm level data was obtained from 
Compustat; data unavailability at that stage reduced the sample for the merger premium regression 
analysis to 210 transactions. The methodology used to test all hypotheses is based on an unbalanced 
panel regression analysis using ordinary least squares. Regressions included variables Winsorized 
at a 10% level, although regressions using un-Winsorized variables and variables Winsorized at a 
20% level was also tested. Logs were taken of certain variables in order to scale coefficients. All 
models included time fixed effects. After all models, the White test examined if heteroskedasticity 
existed. The regressions will reveal the overall determinants of merger premiums on the financial 
services industry for the entire sample period (2004 – 2016), as well if there is any change in 
determinants either pre-crisis (2004 – 2007) and post-crisis (2008 – 2016).  
The model can be summarized as follows: 
Premium =  α + β₀R SIZE + β₁ PA Y M EN T + β₂ T_LTD EB T + β₃ T_N PL + β₄ T_N IM  + 
β₅T_R O E + β₆ T_R O A  + β₇ T_EQ U ITY _A SSET + β₈ T_EFFICIENCY + 
β₉A _N IM  + β₁₀ A_ROE + β₁₁ A_ROA + β₁₂ A_PROV_LOANS +                             
β₁₃ A_EFFICIENCY + β₁₄ PROD_DIV  
Note:   RSIZE is the name for the relative size variable defined by Target Assets divided by Bidder 
Assets plus Target Assets.   
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5. Empirical Analysis and Results  
 
5.1.   Event Study  
 
The first event study (Table 1) examined the four categories of targets and acquirers 
throughout the entire study sample and then looks to see if the cumulative abnormal returns change 
surrounding the three periods of the financial crisis; pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. The first 
category (A) consisted of the returns to acquirer shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target 
are publicly traded where throughout the entire period, returns remained negative, but only 
significantly negative returns where found during the pre-crisis stage which may have influenced 
the entire period returns to remain significantly negative as well. During the crisis period, negative 
returns were smaller, but insignificant, compared to both pre-crisis and post-crisis categories. When 
examining the category (D) consisting of returns to acquirer shareholders in all deals, irrespective 
of target status (public or private), the returns are all positive in all sample periods except the pre-
crisis period. In this category, significantly positive returns were only found during the crisis period 
and then throughout the entire sample period, but not for pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Similar 
to category (A), the crisis period experienced the most favorable returns, compared to the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis periods. Examining the target category (B) of returns to target shareholders in deals 
where both acquirer and target are publicly traded, significantly positive returns are present in all 
four periods with largest significant returns before the crisis and the smallest significant returns in 
the post-crisis period. All returns were significant at the .1% except for the crisis period. The returns 
to target shareholders in all deals, irrespective of acquirer status (C) had similar results only smaller 
cumulative abnormal returns. Examining the differences between shareholders in deals were both 
entities are publicly traded, category (A) and (B), and shareholders in all deals, irrespective of the 
opposite entities status (public or private), category (C) and (D), provides evidence to support 
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asymmetric information where private entities influence the shareholders cumulative abnormal 
returns positively for acquirer shareholders acquiring a private target and negatively for target 
shareholders that are being acquired by a private institution.  
 
The next event study examines the method of payment, whether cash or non-cash, for the 
four categories of targets and acquirers (Table 2a). The returns to acquirer shareholders in deals 
where both acquirer and target are publicly traded (A) for cash payments are negative but not 
significant while non-cash payments experienced significant negative returns. Returns to acquirer 
shareholders in all deals, irrespective of target status (D) for cash payments are positive and 
significant while non-cash payments are still significant but only slightly negative. The returns to 
target shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are publicly traded (B) for cash payments 
Key
A Returns to acquirer shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are publicly traded
B Returns to target shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are publicly traded
C Returns to target shareholders in all deals, irrespective of acquirer status (private or public)
D Returns to acquirer shareholders in all deals, irrespective of target status (private or public)
Entire Period Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis
A -0.38% -0.56% -0.11% -0.48%
-4.377**** -4.226**** -0.152 -2.25
216:306 105:174 31:30 80:102
B 13.75% 14.13% 13.91% 13.04%
12.826**** 10.594**** 3.088** 7.12****
230:66 130:29 27:17 73:20
C 12.82% 13.75% 12.20% 12.03%
13.797**** 11.508**** 4.158**** 7.229****
296:95 149:35 55:27 85:28
D 0.22% -0.04% 0.80% 0.13%
0.516* -2.252 2.689**** 1.298
1295:1264 535:597 360:292 400:382
The 2 day (-1, 0) Cumulative Mean Abnormal Returns are presented below. *, **, ***, and **** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and .1% respectively, based on the Standardized Cross-sectional Test statistic, 
(StdCSectZ, Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen, 1991); followed by the number of firms with positive to negative 
returns below.
Table 1: Event Study Results: Surrounding the Financial Crisis
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and non-cash payments are both significantly positive, however, non-cash payments have slightly 
smaller returns than cash payments. The returns to target shareholders in all deals, irrespective of 
acquirer status (C) are both significantly positive for cash and non-cash payments, but smaller 
returns are seen for cash payments. Excluding for the influence of asymmetric information, category 
(A) and (B), where both entities are publicly traded, suggest cash payments are more favorable to 
acquirer’s and target’s shareholders while non-cash payments significantly reduce returns to both 
acquirer’s and target’s shareholders. This analysis supports that because non-cash payments inherit 
general risk, shareholders of both entities receive lower returns than using the less risky and well-
defined payment of cash.   
 
Key
A Returns to acquirer shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are publicly traded
B Returns to target shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are publicly traded
C Returns to target shareholders in all deals, irrespective of acquirer status (private or public)
D Returns to acquirer shareholders in all deals, irrespective of target status (private or public)
Cash Non-Cash
A -0.33% -0.41%
-1.789 -4.07****
37:48 176:255
B 14.06% 13.95%
4.381*** 12.16****
30:13 199:50
C 12.06% 13.57%
6.833**** 12.02****
90:38 205:53
D 0.44% -0.05%
2.717**** -1.682*
623:533 338:402
Table 2a: Event Study Results: Method of Payment
The 2 day (-1, 0) Cumulative Mean Abnormal Returns are presented below. *, **, ***, and **** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and .1% respectively, based on the Standardized Cross-sectional Test statistic, 
(StdCSectZ, Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen, 1991); followed by the number of firms with positive to negative 
returns below.
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The last event study examines the cumulative abnormal returns relating to product 
diversification whether the transaction involves two identical financial institutions merging or a two 
financial institutions merging that operate in separate industries, defined through their respective 
Standard Industrial Classification (Table 2b). The returns to acquirer shareholders in deals where 
both acquirer and target are publicly traded (A) are only significant for bank vs non-bank mergers 
but both bank vs bank and bank vs non-bank have negative returns. Returns to acquirer shareholders 
in all deals, irrespective of target status (D) generate non-significant returns and is only slightly 
positive in bank vs non-bank. The returns to target shareholders in deals where both acquirer and 
target are publicly traded (B) generate significant positive returns, but bank vs bank generates 
higher returns for the target shareholders. The returns to target shareholders in all deals, irrespective 
of acquirer status (C) are still significantly positive. Excluding for the influence of asymmetric 
information, category (A) and (B), where both entities are publicly traded, non-product 
diversification through two banking institutions merging, explain that economies of scope are more 
favorable to both acquirer’s and target’s shareholders over economics of scope, which is represented 
through product diversification, or a banking institution merging with a non-banking institution, 
where lower returns were experienced by both acquirer’s and target’s shareholders.    
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5.2.   Merger Premiums 
 
The three panel regressions this study examines includes regressions for the entire sample 
period (2004 – 2016), regressions for pre-crisis (2004 – 2007), and regressions for post-crisis (2008 
– 2016) to see if determinants change over the course of the financial crisis. The three types of 
independent variables can be categorized as deal specific, profitability measures, and financial 
condition measures.  
5.2.1.   Deal Specific Variables 
 
The three deal specific variables examined include method of payment, product 
diversification, and geographical diversification. The method of payment in mergers resulted in 
significant results for noncash transactions generating larger premiums than cash transactions for the 
Key
A Returns to acquirer shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are publicly traded
B Returns to target shareholders in deals where both acquirer and target are publicly traded
C Returns to target shareholders in all deals, irrespective of acquirer status (private or public)
D Returns to acquirer shareholders in all deals, irrespective of target status (private or public)
Bank vs. Non-Bank Bank vs. Bank
A -0.49% -0.41%
-4.38**** -1.74
102:188 53:71
B 12.79% 14.69%
10.619**** 7.088****
157:47 71:17
C 13.66% 14.58%
11.752**** 7.264****
195:58 74:18
D 0.04% 0.00%
-1.422 -1.106
375:411 97:124
Table 2b: Event Study Results: Banks Acquiring Banks vs. Non-Banks
The 2 day (-1, 0) Cumulative Mean Abnormal Returns are presented below. *, **, ***, and **** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and .1% respectively, based on the Standardized Cross-sectional Test statistic, 
(StdCSectZ, Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen, 1991); followed by the number of firms with positive to negative 
returns below.
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entire sample period as well as the pre-crisis period but during the post-crisis period, the method of 
payment lost significance. When an acquirer uses non-cash as their method of payment, the inherit 
risks associated with non-cash results in the target to demand a higher premium paid than if the 
acquirer were to use cash. The product diversification variable, defined as two entities operating in 
separate industries vs. two entities operating in the same industry, found that two banks merging will 
result in larger premiums over a bank and a non-banking institution merging. This was also true for 
the entire sample period and the pre-crisis period but again during the post-crisis period, the product 
diversification variable lost its significance. Non-product diversification, resulting from two similar 
entities merging, leading to larger premiums, suggests that acquirers will pay higher premiums for 
economies of scale over economies of scope. Geographic diversity, which was excluded in the final 
models but tested as in a univariate regression, found that this determinant is no longer a significant 
influence in merger premiums to the extent that it was during prior periods, such as the 1980s, and 
how literature concludes that it is still significant in the European banking market. 
5.2.2.    Profitability Measures 
 
The profitability measures for targets includes target net interest margins, target return on 
equity, target return on assets, and target efficiency ratios. Target net interest margins were 
significant through the entire sample period and the pre-crisis period but not for the post-crisis period. 
The net interest margin, or the difference between interest income generated and interest paid to their 
lenders relative to their interest-earning assets, reveals that the target’s ability to generate higher 
profitability from their interest rates will result in larger premiums paid to acquire that target. Target 
return on equity and target return on assets were significant through the entire sample period, pre-
crisis period, and post-crisis period. The return on equity and return on assets, the most common 
measure of profitability in the banking industry, explains that higher profitable banks result in larger 
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premiums. The target efficiency ratio, or the operating expenses over total revenue, measures how 
efficient the operations of a bank are in generating profits. More profitable banks have smaller 
efficiency ratios due to expense discipline. The target efficiency ratio, which was significant 
throughout the entire sample period, pre-crisis period and post-crisis period, concludes that higher 
profitability of targets generate higher merger premiums.  
The profitability measures for acquirer includes acquirer net interest margins, acquirer return 
on equity, acquirer return on assets, and acquirer efficiency ratio. The acquirer net interest margin 
was significant during the entire sample period and pre-crisis period but not for the post-crisis period, 
similar to the target net interest margin. The acquirer’s ability to generate profitability from interest 
rates reveals that acquirer’s profitability influences merger premiums.  The acquirer return on equity 
and acquirer return on assets were significant during the entire sample period and post-crisis period 
but not significant during the pre-crisis time period. Acquirers were more motivated to acquire targets 
with higher profitability during the pre-crisis time period in order to increase their overall 
profitability measures. During the post-crisis time period, the acquirers own profitability measures 
in their motivation behind mergers was not as predominant. The acquirer efficiency ratio was 
significant more during pre-crisis than post-crisis which also confirms the motivation of acquirers to 
pay higher premiums in the pre-crisis time period to increase profitability measures. Unprofitable 
acquirers in the post-crisis period did not have the ability to pay higher premiums to increase their 
profitability measures so only profitable acquirers were able afford paying larger premiums to 
acquire profitable banks. 
5.2.3.   Financial Conditions 
  
The financial condition measures for targets include target long-term debt, target non-
performing loans, and target equity to assets ratio. The target long-term debt measures the amount of 
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leverage a target institution operates with which increases the target’s enterprise value. The 
regression reveals that the lower leverage a banking institutions operates with, the higher premium 
an acquirer is willing to pay due the acquirer not having to assume the target’s debt. The target long-
term debt was significant in determining merger premiums for the entire sample period and pre-crisis 
period but not for the post-crisis period. The equity to asset ratio determines the amount of total 
funding the target has which largely incorporates the target’s deposits. The higher the equity to asset 
ratio of a target bank reveals the lower amount of funding while the lower ratio reveals a higher 
amount of funding. Similar to the target long-term debt, the target equity to asset ratio was significant 
in determining merger premiums in the entire sample period and pre-crisis period but not during the 
post-crisis period. The target non-performing loans examines the strength of the target’s loan 
receivables. The lower amount of non-performing loans would reveal the target’s ability to 
underwrite successful loans and operate with stronger financial conditions. The target non-
performing loans was marginally significant during the entire sample period but not during either 
pre-crisis or post-crisis time frames.     
 The financial condition measure for the acquirer was the provision for loan loss to loans ratio. 
This measures the write-offs that the acquirer had compared to their overall loan receivables. A lower 
provision for loan loss to loans ratio would assume that the acquirer is not writing off a large percent 
of their loan portfolio and is operating with an overall stronger financial condition. The acquirer 
provision for loan loss to loans ratio was not significant during the entire sample and pre-crisis period 
but became significant during the post-crisis period revealing that the acquirer’s financial condition 
was only an influence after the financial crisis where the overall financial condition of banks suffered.   
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Dependent variable: premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 2.495*** 2.745*** 2.537*** 1.777*** 1.905*** 2.093*** 2.925*** 3.492*** 1.782*** 2.140*** 2.183*** 2.600*** 3.339*** 2.343*** 1.886*
(21.55) (17.48) (21.61) (6.62) (13.84) (14.95) (17.34) (10.15) (4.98) (9.82) (10.27) (18.54) (8.67) (18.71) (1.78)
Relative Size -0.645* -0.524 -0.501 -0.657** -0.608** -0.663** -0.690** -0.685** -0.576* -0.439 -0.551 -0.562 -0.451 -0.709** -0.141
(-1.95) (-1.59) (-1.48) (-2.03) (-2.03) (-2.11) (-2.14) (-2.12) (-1.66) (-1.24) (-1.58) (-1.59) (-1.28) (-2.18) (-0.41)
Cash vs. Non-Cash -0.288** -0.300** -0.321** -0.248* -0.189 -0.199 -0.242* -0.226* -0.256** -0.308** -0.272** -0.261** -0.285** -0.233* -0.192
(-2.21) (-2.32) (-2.45) (-1.93) (-1.59) (-1.58) (-1.89) (-1.75) (-2.00) (-2.40) (-2.13) (-2.02) (-2.23) (-1.80) (-1.55)
Target Long Term Debt -0.0587** -0.0772**
(-2.33) (-2.43)
Target Non-Performing Loans -0.0444* 0.00845
(-1.83) (0.31)
Target Net Interest Margin 0.205*** 0.156*
(2.95) (1.88)
Target Return on Equity 5.174*** 2.328
(6.62) (1.09)
Target Return on Assets 42.92*** 25.60
(4.64) (0.94)
Target Equity to Assets Ratio -4.932*** -4.419**
(-3.43) (-2.04)
Target Efficiency Ratio -1.554*** 0.676
(-3.07) (0.82)
Acquirer Net Interest Margin 0.184** 0.0614
(2.06) (0.61)
Acquirer Return on Equity 2.443* 4.440**
(1.84) (2.41)
Acquirer Return on Assets 24.86* -31.37
(1.66) (-1.41)
Acquirer Provision for Loan Loss to Loans Ratio -32.44 -15.11
(-1.52) (-0.74)
Acquirer Efficiency Ratio -1.537** -1.082
(-2.34) (-1.43)
Product Diversification 0.241*** -0.00919
(2.89) (-0.09)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 187 187 187 186 186 210 186
Adjusted R² 0.472 0.484 0.478 0.492 0.567 0.522 0.499 0.494 0.503 0.501 0.499 0.497 0.506 0.491 0.603
Notes: *,**,and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; and t-statistic values are in parentheses below estimated coefficients.
Table 3a presents the panel regression results for Entire sample period (2004 - 2016) with deal premiums as the dependent variable and several independent variables. Relative size was 
the control variable.  
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Dependent variable: premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 2.626*** 2.900*** 2.666*** 1.803*** 1.917*** 2.182*** 3.189*** 3.457*** 1.290** 2.348*** 2.438*** 2.667*** 3.757*** 2.436*** 0.823
(18.67) (13.86) (18.74) (4.96) (10.45) (11.69) (13.57) (7.26) (2.60) (6.54) (7.98) (12.37) (7.04) (14.84) (0.46)
Relative Size -1.163** -1.033** -0.944* -1.084** -1.075** -1.170** -1.143** -1.143** -1.265** -1.046* -1.144** -1.198** -0.972* -1.187** -0.788
(-2.35) (-2.09) (-1.84) (-2.24) (-2.46) (-2.49) (-2.40) (-2.34) (-2.32) (-1.78) (-2.00) (-2.04) (-1.73) (-2.44) (-1.29)
Cash vs. Non-Cash -0.618*** -0.599*** -0.643*** -0.555*** -0.365** -0.518*** -0.435** -0.552*** -0.614*** -0.656*** -0.611*** -0.611*** -0.678*** -0.515** -0.461**
(-3.15) (-3.08) (-3.29) (-2.88) (-2.03) (-2.75) (-2.19) (-2.80) (-3.27) (-3.26) (-3.10) (-3.06) (-3.51) (-2.60) (-2.06)
Target Long Term Debt -0.0650* -0.0313
(-1.75) (-0.51)
Target Non-Performing Loans -0.0519 0.0258
(-1.51) (0.54)
Target Net Interest Margin 0.230** 0.224
(2.45) (1.66)
Target Return on Equity 5.975*** 5.242
(5.27) (0.94)
Target Return on Assets 47.30*** -6.786
(3.41) (-0.10)
Target Equity to Assets Ratio -6.812*** -2.179
(-2.93) (-0.39)
Target Efficiency Ratio -1.312* 1.377
(-1.83) (0.97)
Acquirer Net Interest Margin 0.357*** 0.296*
(2.82) (1.75)
Acquirer Return on Equity 1.996 3.762
(0.85) (1.22)
Acquirer Return on Assets 15.60 -65.91**
(0.71) (-2.07)
Acquirer Provision for Loan Loss to Loans Ratio -9.462 -21.72
(-0.25) (-0.57)
Acquirer Efficiency Ratio -2.023** -1.576
(-2.20) (-1.17)
Product Diversification 0.281** -0.0372
(2.15) (-0.22)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 79 79 79 79 79 102 79
Adjusted R² 0.090 0.109 0.102 0.135 0.288 0.180 0.156 0.111 0.174 0.093 0.090 0.085 0.141 0.123 0.285
Notes: *,**,and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; and t-statistic values are in parentheses below estimated coefficients.
Table 3b presents the panel regression results for Pre-Crisis sample period (2004-2007) with deal premiums as the dependent variable and several independent variables. Relative size was 
the control variable.  
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Dependent variable: premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 1.645*** 1.775*** 1.685*** 1.194*** 1.473*** 1.470*** 1.888*** 2.957*** 1.559*** 1.281*** 1.296*** 1.803*** 2.639*** 1.517*** 2.167
(10.23) (9.14) (9.90) (3.04) (9.20) (9.03) (7.51) (5.34) (3.42) (5.41) (5.02) (10.15) (3.97) (8.49) (1.44)
Relative Size -0.181 -0.0889 -0.126 -0.244 -0.152 -0.207 -0.217 -0.299 -0.179 -0.0549 -0.191 -0.0215 -0.108 -0.249 0.151
(-0.43) (-0.21) (-0.29) (-0.58) (-0.38) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.72) (-0.42) (-0.13) (-0.46) (-0.05) (-0.25) (-0.59) (0.35)
Cash vs. Non-Cash 0.0538 0.0237 0.0301 0.0703 0.0283 0.132 0.0322 0.106 0.0602 0.0460 0.0626 0.0630 0.0973 0.0667 0.0595
(0.32) (0.14) (0.18) (0.42) (0.18) (0.82) (0.19) (0.65) (0.35) (0.28) (0.38) (0.38) (0.58) (0.40) (0.34)
Target Long Term Debt -0.0398 -0.0897**
(-1.19) (-2.24)
Target Non-Performing Loans -0.0245 0.00360
(-0.73) (0.10)
Target Net Interest Margin 0.130 0.106
(1.26) (0.89)
Target Return on Equity 3.771*** 0.00155
(3.48) (0.00)
Target Return on Assets 37.98*** 48.73
(3.23) (1.49)
Target Equity to Assets Ratio -2.258 -4.031
(-1.25) (-1.59)
Target Efficiency Ratio -1.729** 0.372
(-2.47) (0.34)
Acquirer Net Interest Margin 0.0247 -0.0512
(0.20) (-0.39)
Acquirer Return on Equity 3.153** 4.857*
(2.06) (1.69)
Acquirer Return on Assets 34.48* -21.94
(1.72) (-0.58)
Acquirer Provision for Loan Loss to Loans Ratio -51.31** -3.992
(-2.05) (-0.15)
Acquirer Efficiency Ratio -1.471 -1.226
(-1.53) (-1.15)
Product Diversification 0.165 0.00330
(1.59) (0.02)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 107 107 108 107
Adjusted R² 0.088 0.092 0.084 0.094 0.182 0.169 0.094 0.134 0.079 0.118 0.106 0.117 0.100 0.103 0.215
Notes: *,**,and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; and t-statistic values are in parentheses below estimated coefficients.
Table 3c presents the panel regression results for Post-Crisis sample period (2008-2016) with deal premiums as the dependent variable and several independent variables. Relative size 
was the control variable.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Based on the empirical evidence and analysis, I reject the null hypotheses for H1, H2, H3, 
H5 and H6 and fail to reject the null hypothesis of H4. The limitations of this paper include only 
incorporating deals that were completed leading to a survivorship bias and not having the available 
data to determine growth rates of assets and loans for each firm as a determinant in merger premiums. 
Also, this paper only examines 100% ownership transactions. Wealth effects and merger premiums 
continue to be motived by economies of scale and scope. Target shareholders continued to post 
significant gains throughout the crisis period though the number of deals declined dramatically. 
Bidding firm shareholders went from posting significant but low negative returns to insignificant 
returns with the number of deals declining dramatically too. Non-cash transactions and non-product 
diversification was significant leading up to the financial crisis but was not a significant influence 
post-crisis. Merger premiums have consistently been influenced by profitability measures of both the 
target and bidder. Financial condition measures in determining merger premiums significantly 
changed from pre-crisis to post-crisis for both the target and acquirer as well. Overall, the financial 
services industry, although significantly impacted from the financial crisis, has made a rebound.  
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Table 1a.  Initial Number of Deals*, by Year, for the Event Study
Year Number of Deals Distribution
2004 366 10.85%
2005 306 9.07%
2006 361 10.70%
2007 321 9.52%
2008 231 6.85%
2009 240 7.12%
2010 249 7.38%
2011 234 6.94%
2012 236 7.00%
2013 183 5.43%
2014 205 6.08%
2015 240 7.12%
2016 201 5.96%
Total 3373 100.00%
*Note: The eventual event study was run on a subset of these deals due to insufficient daily 
returns data during the estimation period (sample sizes can be obtained by summing the 
number of firms with positive and negative returns under each run)
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Table 2a:  Summary Statistics: Determinants of Premiums
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cash vs. Non-Cash 229 0.1135 0.3179 0 1
Geographic Diversification 210 0.5381 0.4997 0 1
Premium 229 1.8502 0.7782 0.7822 3.1681
Product Diversification 210 0.6429 0.4803 0 1
Relative Size 210 0.1819 0.1269 0.0274 0.4022
Deal Specific
Table 1b. Initial Number of Deals*, by Year, for Regressions
Year Number of Deals Distribution
2004 575 8.14%
2005 558 7.90%
2006 644 9.12%
2007 668 9.46%
2008 526 7.45%
2009 557 7.89%
2010 644 9.12%
2011 598 8.47%
2012 498 7.05%
2013 411 5.82%
2014 443 6.27%
2015 498 7.05%
2016 442 6.26%
Total 7062 100.00%
*Note: The eventual event study was run on a subset of these deals due to insufficient 
data
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Table 2b: Summary Statistics: Target Firm Characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Efficiency Ratio 229 0.6551 0.1048 0.5133 0.8522
Equity to Asset Ratio 229 0.0978 0.0290 0.0607 0.1562
Investments 229 556.3457 805.9621 35.7810 2609.6020
Loan to Assets Ratio 229 0.6592 0.0995 0.4858 0.7993
Long-Term Debt to Equity Ratio 229 0.7875 0.6525 0.0265 2.0429
Net Income 229 23.8679 41.8926 -1.8790 137.7580
Net Interest Income 229 79.3772 102.1115 9.4100 331.5320
Net Interest Margin 229 3.5022 0.5836 2.5600 4.5000
Non-Performing Loans 229 23.9335 34.1610 0.1510 107.3690
Provision for Loan Loss 229 4.8312 7.5494 0 23.7270
Provision for Loan Loss to Loans 229 0.0038 0.0046 0 0.0145
Reserve for Loan Loss 229 19.9890 26.0150 1.5130 85.6640
Reserve for Loan Loss to Loans 229 0.0134 0.0053 0.0061 0.0240
Return on Assets 229 0.0067 0.0054 -0.0042 0.0139
Return on Equity 229 0.0724 0.0619 -0.0518 0.1602
Total Assets 229 2699.4630 3661.0230 319.0270 11798.7800
Total Equity 229 268.3610 375.0126 29.3630 1228.0920
Total Expense 229 156.8133 249.7450 13.4600 821.9070
Total Liability 229 2419.4010 3288.6800 271.1930 10619.4700
Total Loans 229 1692.1400 2257.4650 204.1280 7331.2280
Total Long-Term Debt 229 178.1549 261.0652 2.7800 814.3850
Total Operating Expense 229 127.3414 201.2609 10.8990 664.5960
Total Revenue 229 174.7121 253.5517 16.8620 829.0000
Target
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Table 2c: Summary Statistics: Acquiring Firm Characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Efficiency Ratio 186 0.5804 0.0785 0.4600 0.7025
Equity to Asset Ratio 187 0.1037 0.0236 0.0707 0.1468
Investments 187 3167.9330 4065.3520 159.8060 12993.5400
Loan to Assets Ratio 187 0.6432 0.0794 0.5029 0.7506
Long-Term Debt to Equity Ratio 187 0.6754 0.5342 0.1023 1.6537
Net Income 187 289.7286 513.1194 6.6990 1634.0150
Net Interest Income 187 687.2667 1057.4820 33.8260 3320.3030
Net Interest Margin 187 3.6991 0.4846 2.9500 4.5600
Non-Performing Loans 187 136.7432 206.1356 3.3570 644.0000
Provision for Loan Loss 187 31.5166 55.3807 0 178.6570
Provision for Loan Loss to Loans 186 0.0028 0.0025 0 0.0079
Reserve for Loan Loss 187 140.1064 231.0656 5.2430 770.0000
Reserve for Loan Loss to Loans 186 0.0130 0.0036 0.0081 0.0203
Return on Assets 187 0.0099 0.0032 0.0052 0.0156
Return on Equity 187 0.1023 0.0402 0.0405 0.1679
Total Assets 210 24602.2700 37675.9200 1140.1660 113933.5000
Total Equity 187 2131.1400 3148.5320 113.9750 9731.1660
Total Expense 187 1122.6400 1987.1890 44.6210 6316.2680
Total Liability 187 20147.9900 32030.1800 953.3360 101801.0000
Total Loans 187 15195.6300 24549.8200 659.3900 78153.5200
Total Long-Term Debt 187 1986.9690 3470.2640 31.6440 10218.2800
Total Operating Expense 187 882.6152 1563.3620 36.3180 4978.3300
Total Revenue 187 1639.5820 2977.3150 57.6170 9593.8230
Acquirer
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Entire Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Relative Size -0.1787 -0.1046 -0.0398
(0.0095) (0.2954) (0.6824)
Cash vs. Non-Cash -0.0498 -0.2110 -0.0109
(0.4531) (0.0255) (0.9073)
Target Long Term Debt -0.0063 -0.1461 -0.1559
(0.9244) (0.1242) (0.0933)
Target Non-Performing Loans -0.3956 -0.1763 -0.2914
(0.0000) (0.0629) (0.0014)
Target Net Interest Margin 0.2579 0.2493 0.3049
(0.0001) (0.0080) (0.0008)
Target Return on Equity 0.6316 0.5532 0.4660
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Target Return on Assets 0.5340 0.3356 0.4579
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Target Equity to Assets Ratio -0.1784 -0.2934 0.1144
(0.0068) (0.0017) (0.2192)
Target Efficiency Ratio -0.1904 -0.2968 -0.3472
(0.0038) (0.0015) (0.0001)
Acquirer Net Interest Margin 0.1420 0.2912 0.0720
(0.0525) (0.0092) (0.4591)
Acquirer Return on Equity 0.5027 -0.0152 0.1688
(0.0000) (0.8945) (0.0807)
Acquirer Return on Assets 0.4224 0.0648 0.2447
(0.0000) (0.5704) (0.0107)
Acquirer Provision for Loan Loss to Loans Ratio -0.1949 -0.1475 -0.2949
(0.0077) (0.1945) (0.0020)
Acquirer Efficiency Ratio -0.1334 -0.1991 -0.2759
(0.0694) (0.0786) (0.0040)
Product Diversification 0.1516 0.2256 0.1157
(0.0280) (0.0226) (0.2331)
Notes: p values are in parentheses below estimated coefficients.
Table 3: Spearman Pairwise Correlations between Merger Premiums and the list of variables in Column 1.
